The Author was the Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Southern Naval Command when he retired on November 30, 2021. He is a Navigation and Direction specialist. He was also the Director General Naval Operations and the Chief of Personnel, Indian Navy.

The recent inking of a ‘nonbinding and non-financial MoU’ between Mazagon Docks Limited (MDL) and ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) on June 7, 2023 to provide engineering and design consultancy support to MDL, has once again brought to the fore the urgent necessity for India to revive its domestic conventional submarine production line, which has fallen idle after the launch of the sixth and last Scorpene class submarine being built at MDL, INS Vagsheer, in April 2022. The submarine, which started sea trials in May 2023, is currently undergoing sea trials prior being commissioned into the Indian Navy.

India’s Ambitious Submarine Building Plan

Under the now well-known 30-year submarine building plan, approved by the Vajpayee government in 1999, India was to build 24 submarines over a 30-year period (1999-2029), with progressively greater indigenous content, until the final batch would be fully designed and built in India. Media reports also indicate that a few years ago the Indian Navy had approached the Government to amend the 30-year submarine building plan by replacing six conventional submarines with an unspecified number of indigenously designed and built nuclear attack submarines (SSNs). Having gained enough experience in the design and construction of ballistic missile armed nuclear submarines (SSBNs) it would make eminent sense for India to use the in-house expertise for building SSNs, whenever this programme is approved by the government. Based on past experience of other countries who have designed and built SSNs, especially China, it is estimated that the first indigenous SSN will take at least 15 years to be launched, after the construction programme is approved. The proposed indigenous SSN construction programme would take India into an elite club of SSN-builders and operators, which today comprises the US, Russia, UK, China and France.

As far as India’s conventional submarine building plan is concerned, several positive developments have taken place with regard to the indigenisation of critical capabilities for conventional submarines. After the successful demonstration of the indigenous Air Independent Technology (AIP) module by India’s Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) on a land-based prototype in 2021, a pact was inked between DRDO and Naval Group, France, in January 2023, to install the first module on board INS Kalvari during its forthcoming major refit. Once trials are successful, it would form the basis of equipping future indigenous submarines, apart from the other P-75 boats. AIP submarines are also called the ‘poor man’s SSN’ as it allows them to remain submerged for greater lengths of time without surfacing, which makes them more difficult to detect. India has also become self-sufficient in the design and fabrication of advanced sonars, combat management suites and communication equipment for our submarines. The indigenous heavyweight torpedo, Varunastra, is making steady progress with the first successful underwater target engagement announced by the Indian Navy on June 6, 2023. The DRDO had intimated that a variant of Varunastra will one day arm our future submarines. In January 2022, the Indian Navy had also certified the use of indigenous submarinebuilding steel, being made at the Rourkela Steel Plant (under the Steel Authority of India) for use in the construction of future submarines to be built in India. The announcement of the ‘strategic partnership’ model in 2017 was another positive step in the acquisition process of large and complex weapon systems, such as submarines.

Foreign Collaboration and Challenges

However, despite many positive achievements, the progress on the construction of the submarines remains excruciatingly slow. Only six of the 24 submarines have been built thus far, over the past 24 years of the envisaged 30-year plan period. Progress for the next batch under Project 75(I), with AIP capability, acquisition for which was commenced over a decade ago, is still at the RFP response stage under the ‘Strategic Partnership’ model. The current RFP was issued in July 2021 to MDL and Larsen & Toubro (L&T), from the public and private sector respectively. These two shipbuilders were to partner with a foreign Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) to build the six submarines. However, the timeline for bid submission has been extended several times, with the current date being August 1, 2023. The non-submission of bids is reportedly due to issues with some stipulations of the RFP. As per news reports, DCNS France pulled out of the project citing inability to meet the provisions of the AIP system mentioned in the RFP. Two other OEMs, Navantia, Spain and ROE-Russia did not have an AIP, leaving only South Korea and Germany in the fray. Past track record indicates that it will take at least a decade for the first P-75(I) submarine to be constructed after the conclusion of the contract – in the case of the Scorpene programme, the first submarine was commissioned in 2017, 11 years after the contract was signed with DCNS, France. Since it will take at least a couple of years for the contact to be signed after the submission of bids, and assuming that the bids are now indeed submitted by August 1, 2023, the first P-75(I) submarine is likely to be ready for trials only by 2035.

Current Status of the Submarine Fleet

The Indian Navy’s current conventional submarine force levels comprise the six new Scorpene class submarines,the seven remaining Russian-origin EKM and four German-origin HDW submarines. The EKM and HDW submarines are ageing, having been commissioned between 1986 and 2000, and will have to be de-inducted progressively over the next decade, after reaching the end of their service life. It is, therefore, evident that a serious degradation in force levels of conventional submarines looms before us, which needs to be addressed urgently. The construction of next two batches of conventional and nuclear submarines takes on added urgency in the face of enhanced inductions of submarines, both in Pakistan and China. Pakistan had signed a contract with China in 2015 to construct eight Yuanclass (Type 039-A) conventional AIP-capable submarines at an estimated cost of $5 billion – the first four in China and the last four in KSEW, Karachi. Work on these submarines is progressing expeditiously with the first boat scheduled to be delivered in end 2023. Given the speed of construction at Chinese shipyards, especially as the Yuan class is a proven design; it is quite likely that the first four submarines will be commissioned on schedule. Steel cutting ceremony for the fifth submarine, to be built at KSEW, was also held in December 2021. Once all eight submarines are delivered, probably over the next decade, the Pakistan Navy’s sea denial capability will be greatly enhanced. The Yuan class submarines have already been deployed in the IOR and one boat also visited Karachi in 2015, where it reportedly embarked Pakistan Navy personnel for ‘experience’ sorties. Subsequent training of Pakistani crew in China will ensure quick operationalisation of these submarines. Meanwhile, China’s own submarine (and ship) building programme is proceeding apace, and as per the latest assessment given to the US Congress by the US Department of Defence in March 2023, now comprises a force level of 56 modern conventional submarines and nine nuclear attack submarines (not counting its six SSBNs).

This decline in the Indian Navy’s submarine force levels comes at a juncture when India is facing a challenging geopolitical environment, with confrontation with China in particular having peaked since the Galwan clashes in 2020. China had commenced regular deployments of both its conventional and nuclear submarines to the IOR since 2013, apart from its warships, under the pretext of anti-piracy patrols over the past decade. China’s Djibouti naval base is also capable of berthing and supporting both nuclear and conventional submarines. Karachi and Gwadar are two additional ports that China could use for supporting submarine operations in the waters around us. With Russia now being embroiled in a prolonged war against Ukraine, Its reliability as an arms supplier has become more tenuous than it already was since the end of the Cold War, due to Western sanctions against the country and Russia’s own commitment to the war. As such, with Russia and China reaching new heights of bilateral ties under their ‘no limits’ friendship, Russia’s unstinted support in a possible Sino-Indian conflict cannot be taken for granted.

India is today the world’s fifth largest economy and is likely to move up to the third position by 2030. Our economy is substantially dependent on the seas, both for trade as also for energy security. Submarines are a potent weapon platform that can threaten not only warships, but also merchant ships during an armed conflict. Submarines, especially AIP-equipped boats and SSNs are also force multipliers in any conflict at sea, and the side having an edge in this regard has a definite advantage over its adversary, besides being a significant deterrent to conflict itself. In this regard it may be prudent to recollect the force imbalance at sea during the 1965 Indo-Pak War, when the Pakistan Navy had one submarine, the PNS Ghazi (later sunk in the 1971 War) and the Indian Navy did not yet possess a submarine arm.

Course Correction in Submarine Imbalance

The growing imbalance in force levels of submarines between India and its two adversaries, is therefore, cause for worry. Indeed, unless replacements for submarines scheduled to be decommissioned over the next decade are not contracted in good time, there is a distinct possibility that the Indian Navy’s conventional submarine force levels could dip to single digits, and even fall below those with Pakistan. Faced with China’s growing naval strength in the Indo-Pacific, the US and UK have combined forces to arm Australia with SSNs under the AUKUS trilateral security pact. However, India not being part of a military alliance will require its owncredible underwater capabilities.

To achieve this, India is faced with a twin conundrum – the need to urgently bolster its declining submarine force levels, which is time critical, while also ensuring that it attains the goal of indigenous capability in submarine design production, which will a much longer time period to achieve. Consequently, a multi-pronged strategy will need to be followed to achieve both objectives. The design and eventual construction of an indigenous conventional submarine needs to be pursued through inhouse R&D, supplemented by transfer of technology for key equipment, and executed in a time-bound manner. In parallel, we need to pursue the early induction of conventional submarines through foreign collaboration, preferably under a government-to-government agreement, as exemplified by the recent understanding between India and the US to co-produce fighter jet engines in India. The recent MoU between TKMS and MDL is a positive step in this direction.

In the interim, the capability gap arising out of the delay in the induction of conventional submarines needs to be filled by going in for at least three additional Scorpenes, with advancements in technology and design, and a higher level of indigenisation (including the indigenous AIP). This would have the advantage of faster replenishment of force levels and commonality of platforms, with all its attendant benefits, besides feeding into our indigenous submarine programme. This would also ensure the continued use of the infrastructure and employment of human expertise available at MDL, which has been built up in a painstaking manner over the past decade, and needs to be gainfully utilised, before it can be channelized for the P-75(I). In parallel, the project for the indigenous production of SSNs needs to be given the green signal at the earliest.

To enable the Indian Navy to meet its requirement of ensuring India’s maritime security in its vast area of operation in the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean, there is a need to take urgent steps to redress this situation. Submarines form a critical component of maritime power and their declining numbers should make decision makers take immediate steps for restoring force levels to the necessary numbers, principally by expediting the indigenous production of both conventional and nuclear attack submarines. Our national security cannot brook any further delay.”