The 2019 agreement between India and Russia — a $3 billion lease for a capable Akula-class SSN for ten years — signalled a conscious drive by India to upgrade its undersea warfare capability. The vessel, to join as INS Chakra-III, was originally scheduled for delivery by 2025.

But now that delivery has slipped to 2028. The delay owes to a complex mix of technical difficulties, supply-chain constraints worsened by the Russia–Ukraine war, and broader geopolitical uncertainty.

That postponement matters — and not just in calendar years. It prolongs a critical capability gap for the Indian Navy: since the earlier leased SSN (the previous INS Chakra II) returned to Russia in 2021, India has effectively been without a nuclear-powered attack submarine.

This hiatus comes at a time when undersea capabilities are rapidly becoming central to power projection, maritime domain awareness, and strategic deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.

Why INS Chakra-III matters

Despite the delay, INS Chakra-III remains a strategically solid acquisition — arguably more relevant than ever in the current maritime environment. The modernised Akula design promises significant capabilities: stealth, deep-diving endurance, high sustained speeds, and armament flexibility (torpedoes, heavyweight weapons, and, reportedly, long-range cruise missiles such as the 3M14K “Kalibr” with up to 1,500-2,000 km reach).

In practical terms, this gives India an underwater platform that can — if needed — operate far from coastal waters, conduct long-range strike missions, undertake intelligence and surveillance, and provide a credible deterrent floating under the oceans.

For a regional power aiming to secure its maritime interests in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) amidst growing Chinese naval assertiveness, that capability is not nice-to-have — it is essential.

Furthermore, Chakra-III serves as an important interim bridge. While India builds its own next-generation SSNs under Project 77 (scheduled to deliver the first indigenous SSN by 2036–37), a leased Akula helps maintain operational familiarity, sustain crew readiness, and ensure continuity of nuclear-submarine-level deterrence.

Risks, trade-offs, and the limits of a lease-based approach

Yet, the Chakra-III path is not without complications or risks. The delays illustrate exactly why relying on foreign-built, refurbished and leased platforms can be unpredictable. As pointed out by analysts close to the negotiations, the long timeline — carved out to refurbish, modernise, and integrate Indian systems (like sonar, communication, tactical control) — includes many moving parts.

Moreover, while a leased SSN fills a short-term gap, it does not substitute for long-term strategic autonomy. The 10-year lease might give the Navy some time, but it also imposes inevitable limitations — in maintenance flexibility, lifecycle management, upgrades, and future-proofing. Once the lease ends, unless renewed or replaced, the capability vanishes. This underlines the importance of India’s push for its own SSNs under Project 77 — a plan that must succeed if India’s undersea ambitions are to be sustainable.

Finally, in the current geopolitical backdrop — supply-chain disruptions, sanctions, and global contestation — such deals may be subject to delays, renegotiation, or external interference, making them vulnerable. Strategic planners must factor that risk.

China’s naval progress

According to a recent fact-sheet, PLAN currently has six SSBNs (ballistic-missile submarines) and six SSNs (attack submarines), along with a much larger force of conventional diesel/electric + AIP submarines.

Older data show that over the years, China steadily expanded its nuclear submarine fleet. For instance, by 2020 they had about six SSBNs and 7 SSNs; some projections suggest this could grow to ~8 SSBNs and ~13 SSNs by 2030.

Each Type 094 carries submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Early versions used the JL-2 SLBM, which had intercontinental range; more recent boats are believed to be capable of using improved missiles such as JL-3 SLBM, extending reach and adding to sea-based nuclear deterrence.

China is already working on a next-generation SSBN: the Type 096 (Tangclass). This new class is expected to feature improved stealth, sensors and weapons, potentially marking a qualitative jump in China’s sea-based nuclear capability.

The backbone of China’s SSN fleet is the Type 093 (Shang-class). According to recent data, PLAN operates a total of about 6 SSNs from this class (including variants Type 093, 093A, and possibly newer 093B).

The newer Shang-class submarines offer better stealth (quieter), more advanced sensors, and more capable weapons (torpedoes, anti-ship missiles) — making them a credible platform for sea-control, anti-ship or anti-submarine operations, and possibly land-attack with conventional cruise missiles.

The presence of a credible SSBN fleet (Type 094, and future Type 096) gives China a sea-based nuclear deterrent — vital for second-strike capability, survivability of its nuclear deterrent, and strategic depth. This makes China’s nuclear posture more survivable and less vulnerable to pre-emptive strikes on land-based assets.

An expanding SSN fleet enhances China’s ability to project power undersea — conducting submarine patrols, imposing sea-denial, threatening surface ships and other submarines, gathering intelligence, and potentially projecting deterrence beyond coastal waters.

For regional powers (India, Pacific-rim states, US & allies), China’s growing nuclear-submarine capability adds complexity: underwater tracking, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), maritime surveillance will become more challenging — raising the bar for detection and counter-submarine operations.

Given China’s shipbuilding capacity (some shipyards reportedly capable of producing multiple nuclear submarines per year), the long-term trajectory points toward a larger, more advanced and stealthier nuclear-submarine fleet.