Maritime piracy in the 21st century shows no signs of abating even after several years of unprecedented multinational naval patrolling and intensive efforts by the global community. Last year, over 50 ships were hijacked globally. More than half were hijacked by Somali pirates and held for ransom. Though the number of successful hijackings by Somali pirates has reduced for the first time in years; from 49 in 2010 to 26 in 2011, a significant drop in numbers is attributed mainly to increased employment of private security by merchant ships and adoption of the best management practices by the shipping industry, the total ransom collected by Somali pirates has increased substantially. In 2010, the highest ransom ever paid was about $10 million for the south Korean tanker samho dream. This was considered an aberration since most ransom demands were of the order of $4-5 million. However, since 2011, this has changed significantly. In 2011, the Greek VLCC Irene fetched the Somali pirates $13.5 million in ransom while many others paid ransoms of the order of $10 million. It is estimated that while in 2010 about $80 million was received by Somali pirates as ransom, in 2011, this figure almost doubled to about $150 million. This is a very dangerous trend and is likely to lead to greater violence against the crew when their companies are unable to meet the demands of desperate Somali pirates. The case of the MV Suez in 2010, wherein the owners refused to pay the steep ransom demanded by the Somali pirates, and the crew (mostly Indian) were held in custody and tortured by the pirates, is a pointer to what could happen.

Over the years, the Somali piracy model has evolved in many ways. It originally started off as attempts by Somali fishermen to keep off foreign transgressions in their waters. In the absence of an effective government, since the removal from power of the authoritarian regime of said Barre in January 1991, a few self-styled armed protection groups such as the Somali National Volunteer Coast Guard and the Puntland Coast Guard took it upon themselves to chase out foreign fishing trawlers from the region. Soon, they moved on to attacking private yachts transiting the Somali EEZ and then to hijacking merchant ships. The Somali pirates made global headlines for the first time when on November 5, 2005, they attempted to hijack the us cruise liner seabourn spirit approximately 75 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia. This unsuccessful attack triggered a wave of piracy attacks along the Somali coast. Subsequently, Somali pirates made headlines in India when in february 2006, they hijacked an Indian dhow named Bhakti sagar (registered in porbandar) while on passage to Kisamayu. At least 25 Indian crew members were held hostage till a large undisclosed amount was paid as ransom by the owners.

In 2006, there were 22 incidents of attacks on ships by Somali pirates. The numbers have since increased rapidly; more than doubling with each passing year; from 51 in 2007 to 111 in 2008, 217 in 2009 and 2010, and 231 in 2011. Just as the number of attacks has increased over the years, so have the tactics employed by the pirates improved significantly. Somali pirates currently function in large organised groups operating out of the well-equipped coastal bases. Their senior leadership includes retired Somali naval officers some of whom have been trained in erstwhile USSR. The pirate groups now routinely use hijacked vessels for launching attacks at far off distances. These groups are estimated to have a well developed intelligence system that provides information about movement of ships in the region and allows for selective targeting. The modus operandi of the pirates is to loiter near the busy sea lanes of the region on a hijacked medium-sized vessels or mother ship for days, looking out for a suitable merchant ship to target and then attack it with small but fast moving skiffs or boats at close ranges. The pirates, equipped with AK-47s and rocket launchers fire indiscriminately at the ships to force them to stop. Once on board, the pirates quickly take charge of the crew and its master, and divert the ship to Somali waters.

In mid-2009, with the arrival of the second standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2), the number of warships on antipiracy patrols in the Gulf of aden had reached a record number of about 20-25 ships on patrol. It was expected that piracy would soon be brought under control. However, much to the contrary, in 2009, the number of piracy attacks stood at 217, compared to 111 in 2008. Piracy had more than doubled during the period that a record number of warships were on patrol. Till this day, almost all the G-20 countries are represented in the region including the Multinational Task force 151, european union naval force, NATO and several other naval ships on independent patrol. However, this has not deterred the Somali pirates who continue to attack ships with impunity.

In 2010, under criticism from the shipping industry for not using adequate force, several navies stepped up pressure on the pirates by launching special operations to rescue captured crew and ships, and apprehend the pirates. However, this led to a few severe reprisals by the pirate groups. Notable being the incident of SV Quest in which four americans were killed in cold blood following the recapture of the american ship Maersk albama by the us marines who had killed three Somali pirates onboard the ship. Such reprisals have discouraged most navies from taking aggressive actions and merchant ships have now found it more useful to hire private security and employ their own self-defence measures. After much reluctance even International Maritime Bureau and International Maritime Organisation now advise ships to employ private security. However, piracy continues unabated and virtually unchallenged. One wonders where all this will lead to and will the navies of the world ever be successful in curbing piracy or will the international community successfully rehabilitate Somalia and wean its people away from crime?