The recent visit of Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh to Russia in December 2011 led to media reports that Nerpa, the long awaited Akula II class nuclear powered attack submarine (SSN) rechristened as INS Chakra, is likely to be in home waters on a 10-year lease in the first quarter of 2012. Another press report stated that Arihant, the country’s first indigenously designed nuclear submarine, will put to sea for trials also in the first quarter of 2012. While the exact dates for both may still be uncertain, the fact remains that the Indian Navy is poised on the cusp of attaining a capability that will make it truly balanced three dimensional blue water navy commensurate with the nation’s security interests across the entire spectrum. Their induction will not only lead to a reorientation of our national security concerns but will in due course, usher in a paradigm shift in the geostrategic contours which shape the regional maritime security scenario.

This would not be India’s first tryst with a nuclear submarine. In 1988, the Indian Navy had leased a Charlie I class SSN from the erstwhile Soviet Union for a period of three years. Commissioned into the Indian Navy as INS Chakra, it was duly returned in 1991, but not before the Indian Navy gained valuable insight and experience in operating and maintaining these highly sophisticated platforms.

Nuclear Concerns

The Cold War which ‘raged’ for over four decades was marked by certain predictability with well-defined protagonists and both sides having an arsenal that could annihilate the world several times over. This destructive power itself came to define modern-day strategic deterrence. It was in fact the SSBN more than anything else that characterised the Cold War. The omnipre-sent threat of nuclear attack from an unseen launch platform and also the inability to neutralise a retaliatory strike against it, ensured that frequent standoffs between the protagonists remained ‘cold’.

The two defining moments in modern history, the end of the cold war with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the cataclysmic events of September 11, 2001, ushered in an era of uncertainty which has made the world a far more dangerous place to live in.

The number of declared nuclear weapon states has doubled in the last decade or so which in itself is a matter of concern. What is of even greater concern is that some of these have an extremely dubious track record of proliferation, while some others have a questionable security apparatus to ensure their safe custody. There are also some covert programmes under way which add to the unpredictability. This clear and present danger is still driving the ‘big five’ to retain and renew their nuclear deterrence capability, albeit with smaller numbers despite the onset of difficult economic times where defence cutbacks are the order of the day.

Much has been written about this being the Asian century. Mahan’s prophecy that the destiny of the world will be decided on the waters of the Indian Ocean rings is emerging increasingly true. For India, this ushers in numerous challenges. Of the 10 overt and covert nuclear weapon states, six are Asian and of these, four are part of the Indian Ocean littoral. China is on the periphery but has considerable economic interests in the region. Countries like Pakistan, North Korea, Israel and Iran view nuclear militarisation as an existential necessity. This insecurity fuels further uncertainty about their provocation threshold as they maintain an aggressive nuclear posture.

US President Barack Obama recently declared that the Asia-Pacific is a priority area for the US and India is a strategic ally. This is like waving the proverbial red flag to the bull and China has promptly responded with its customary bluntness. The US has a host of bilateral and multilateral security arrangements in the region which also spill over into the Indian Ocean. These nations need to be reassured by the US in this era of defence cutbacks. The reference to India as a strategic partner perhaps indicates that India would have to take up the slack, if any, in the Indian Ocean. China clearly views the US as its primary long-term military threat as it aspires to have superpower status and is therefore wary of a possible Indo-US or India-US-Japan alliance. As the two largest economies in the region with global aspirations, operating in the same waters and vying for resources from the same region, there is definite potential for a future Sino-Indian conflict. China could also enter into alliances with the other Indian Ocean nuclear states to counter Indian aspirations in the IOR thus triggering off a second Cold War, and this time in the Indian Ocean.

India became a declared nuclear weapon state in May 1998. Soon thereafter, a draft nuclear doctrine was enunciated which comprised two major elements; no first use (NFU) and ‘credible minimum deterrence.’ The official nuclear doctrine was finally published in 2003. These two elements became the pivots of our nuclear posture. The doctrine also enunciated that Indian nuclear forces will be deployed to ensure survival against a first strike…with adequate retaliatory capabilities for a punishing strike which would be unacceptable to the aggressor. In 2004, the Indian maritime doctrine translated this into the maritime domain stating, “To achieve strategic deterrence, it is vital for a nation to possess nuclear submarines capable of launching missiles with nuclear warheads.” The Indian Maritime Military Strategy released in 2007, clearly articulated that “the most credible of all arsenals in a second strike is the nuclear-armed missile submarine”.

The launch of the Arihant in July 2009 and the news that it would be put to sea for trials in early 2012 could not have come a moment too soon as it would provide the vital and most effective third leg of the nuclear triad and would thus validate the NFU policy. NFU is an option that only China has promulgated amongst all other nuclear powers. For us it is significant that Pakistan has not done so. Such intent needs to be treated with great caution. It is therefore essential that our second strike capability is not only invulnerable but also lethal enough to effect deterrence. India is in the unique and unenviable position of having nuclear armed neighbours on both sides. Both of these have an adversarial relationship with us and an unholy nexus between themselves. Both also have a proliferation record which is not above suspicion and this introduces an element of uncertainty in the regional security calculus. Our defences therefore have to be robust enough to deter any aggressor and we should have the ability to take the fight to the enemy across the entire spectrum of conflict. The nuclear powered strategic ballistic missile submarine provides us that capability.

Maritime Security Concerns

The Indian Ocean Region is going to occupy a centre stage in the 21st century. While global business will be conducted across its waters and it will be home to some of the most dynamic economies in the world, it will also remain a veritable tinderbox riven by political instability, ethnic conflagrations, violent internecine struggles and some of the most impoverished nations on earth. A large number of civil insurgency, inter- and intra-state conflicts and deeply suspicious neighbours characterise this entire region from its western to its eastern extremes. The French, in their 2008 white paper, described this region as an arc of instability.

India is a major stakeholder in the Indian Ocean. It is the largest and most powerful country in the region and thus has an important role to play. It is one of the few politically stable democracies in the IOR with a national posture broadly aligned with the acceptable global legal framework. It is therefore expected to play an important role in ensuring the safety of the ‘wide commons’ for the passage of trade and freedom of navigation for ships transiting the international sea lanes (ISL) that criss-cross the IOR. Closer home, it has a pivotal location in what President Obama has called the “most dangerous place on earth”. Recent events across our western borders also do not augur well for peace and stability in the region.

Peninsular India’s geographical landmass juts almost a thousand miles into the centre of the Indian Ocean. Strategically, this assumes great importance as some of the most important ISLs pass in close proximity to the southern tip of the country. Some of the world’s most critical chokepoints are located in the IOR. At least five of these are very vulnerable and any disruption of traffic through these could have serious repercussions on the global economy. The Iranian threat to block the Straits of Hormuz is one recent example.

The importance of the maritime domain in India’s strategic calculus can never be underestimated. In fact, notwithstanding its peninsular geography, strategically it is very much a maritime state. The geostrategic imperatives which shape India’s maritime fortunes are critical vulnerabilities necessitating a strong and adaptable maritime security construct.

In the IOR, China has emerged as the elephant in the room. A coordinated strategy to extend its maritime reach is well under way. By constantly referring to its mastery of the seas in the medieval period, it is emphasising its maritime credentials and highlighting the importance of the maritime space for its emergence as a global superpower. The ‘String of Pearls,’ strategy has been written and spoken about extensively. The recent arrangement with Seychelles is a major cause for worry for India. Just as China considers South East Asia within its sphere of influence, so India must also perceive these island groups as a part of its strategic space.