The employment of privately contracted armed security personnel is now a common practice. This has led to a mushrooming of maritime security companies in the region and has given rise to the potential danger of an unregulated private security business model going out of hand.

The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) during its 89th session from May 11-20 has promulgated new guidelines for flag states, ship-owners, operators and masters on the employment of privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP). This is a bold and timely decision and a major shift in the earlier stated policy of IMO which discouraged private armed security. The new IMO guidelines seek to regulate private security and call for suitable mechanisms to be drafted by the flag states and shipping companies to prevent mishaps. The guidelines also include sections on risk assessment, selection criteria, insurance cover, command and control, management and use of weapons and ammunition at all times and rules for the use of force as agreed between the ship owner, security provider and the master. The new guidelines come with a caveat stating that employment of PCASP should not be considered as an alternative to the best management practices or other protective security measures and that PCASP should be employed only after a thorough risk assessment.

Since 2005, when Somali pirates had first started making global headlines, the IMO had strictly discouraged employment of PCASP onboard ships. It was viewed that PCASP could lead to increased violence at sea. Until 2009, it appeared that the Somali piracy model was based on a peaceful extraction of ransom and the Somali pirates generally ensured that none of the crew members were harmed as long as the shipping company paid the ransom. A piracy incident of September 8 seemed to support this modus operandi. During the hijacking of the Ukrainian freighter Faina, off the coast of Somalia, the pirate leader admitted via phone to a New York Times reporter that the group wanted “just money.” over the years, Somali piracy has emerged as a lucrative business model—low risk and high rewards. This has attracted several enterprising and adventurous Somalis, including retired former naval Captains and Admirals, who received their training in erstwhile USSr, to take up this profession. The average ransoms demanded has grown from $150,000 ( Rs. 68 lakh) in 2005 to $5.4 million ( Rs. 24 crore) in 2010. Currently, it is estimated that there are about 50 groups and about 2,000 to 3,000 pirates operating out of six different locations on the east coast of Somalia. emboldened by their past successes, the Somali pirates have now graduated to attacking ships—using captured regular, ocean-going vessel—at distances in excess of a thousand miles from the east African coast.

In recent months, piratical attacks have been accompanied by a marked increase in violence. The pirate groups have become increasingly daring and frequently attack the ships with rockets, close range firing with automatic weapons, etc to terrorise masters to stop ship. There are also reports of several crew members being tortured to extract maximum ransom, resulting in the death of a few personnel. This year, seven people have been killed (as on April 28) by the Somali pirates including two aged American couples from the SV Quest. In an unprecedented development in April, seven Indian crew members of the Asphalt Venture were held back even after the shipping company paid the ransom. The remaining crew were released with the ship. This action was in retaliation to the Indian Navy’s arrest of over 100 Somali pirates.

The increased audacity of the Somali pirates, leading to a spurt in the number of attacks and violence against the crew has been precipitated by two key factors. first is the lack of propensity of the shipping industry to invest in self-defence measures. Currently, it is estimated that only one out of 10 ships employs onboard security. This has made the merchant ships ‘sitting ducks’ in the vast ocean and easy prey even for small lightly armed pirate bands. Perhaps this is the fallout of the global financial crisis of 2008 which resulted in the crash of the Baltic freight Index by almost 90 per cent. freight earning dropped and consequently most shipping companies were reluctant to invest in onboard security to cut down their operating costs. The period between 2008 and 2009 witnessed a sudden rise in piracy and there were several instances of ships being hijacked with absolutely no efforts by the ship or crew to deter or evade the pirates.

The second key factor has been the inability of the navies to ensure security of the shipping lanes. The shipping industry was hopeful that the warships deployed on anti-piracy patrols off Somalia since 2005 would gradually succeed in curbing and localising piracy. however, contrary to expectations, piracy continued unabated despite intensive patrolling by warships. Between 2006 and 2009, the number of piratical attacks continued to increase rapidly; more than doubling with each passing year; from 22 in 2006 to 51 in 2007 to 111 in 2008 and 217 in 2009. Strangely, in 2009, while the number of warships on patrols reaching a record number of about 27 to 30 combatants; in 2010, there were 219 incidents of piracy. Moreover, with every passing year, the range of pirate attacks increased westwards extending from the east coast of Somali to reach close to the west coast of India by 2010.